Arunava Sen - Citas de Google Académico

Citado por

	Total	Desde 2014
Citas	2393	952
Índice h	24	18
Índice i10	40	27

200

100

150

19901991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201922 12 28 15 31 16 47 30 22 44 28 65 77 54 54 62 72 93 90 119 78 106 103 110 143 175 133 184 162 155

Coautores

Bhaskar DuttaProfessor of Economics, University of WarwickDirección de correo verificada de warwick.ac.uk
Sushil BikhchandaniAnderson School of Management, UCLADirección de correo verificada de anderson.ucla.edu
Nicolas GravelDirecteur du Centre de Sciences Humaines, DelhiDirección de correo verificada de univ-amu.fr
Ahuva Mu'alemHITDirección de correo verificada de cs.technion.ac.il
Noam NisanProfessor of Computer Science, Hebrew University of JerusalemDirección de correo verificada de cs.huji.ac.il
Ron LaviTechnion -- Israel Institute of TechnologyDirección de correo verificada de ie.technion.ac.il
Debasis MishraIndian Statistical InstituteDirección de correo verificada de isid.ac.in
Jim BerginQueen's UniversityDirección de correo verificada de econ.queensu.ca
Jordi MassóProfessor of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaDirección de correo verificada de uab.es
Levent UlkuITAMDirección de correo verificada de itam.mx
Swaprava NathAssistant Professor, CSE, IIT KanpurDirección de correo verificada de cse.iitk.ac.in
Mandar MitraIndian Statistical InstituteDirección de correo verificada de isical.ac.in

Arunava Sen

Indian Statistical Institute

Dirección de correo verificada de isid.ac.in - Página principal

Implementation voting mechanism design auction theory


Título	Citado por	Año
Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium D Abreu, A Sen Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 997-1021, 1991	252	1991
Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant‐strategy implementation S Bikhchandani, S Chatterji, R Lavi, A Mu'alem, N Nisan, A Sen Econometrica 74 (4), 1109-1132, 2006	210	2006
Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition D Abreu, A Sen Journal of Economic theory 50 (2), 285-299, 1990	192	1990
A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation B Dutta, A Sen The Review of Economic Studies 58 (1), 121-128, 1991	171	1991
Nash implementation with partially honest individuals B Dutta, A Sen Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 154-169, 2012	125	2012
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences S Barberà, B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Economic Theory 101 (2), 374-394, 2001	103	2001
Dictatorial domains N Aswal, S Chatterji, A Sen Economic Theory 22 (1), 45-62, 2003	101	2003
Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments B Dutta, A Sen, R Vohra Economic Design 1 (1), 173-203, 1994	100	1994
Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability ML Breton, A Sen Econometrica 67 (3), 605-628, 1999	86	1999
Implementation under strong equilibrium: A complete characterization B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Mathematical Economics 20 (1), 49-67, 1991	74	1991
Another direct proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem A Sen Economics Letters 70 (3), 381-385, 2001	64	2001
Tops-only domains S Chatterji, A Sen Economic Theory 46 (2), 255-282, 2011	52	2011
Ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1), 90-101, 1996	50	1996
Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules D Majumdar, A Sen Econometrica 72 (2), 523-540, 2004	47	2004
Random dictatorship domains S Chatterji, A Sen, H Zeng Games and Economic Behavior 86, 212-236, 2014	38	2014
Random dictatorship domains S Chatterji, A Sen, H Zeng Games and Economic Behavior 86, 212-236, 2014	38	2014
Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes B Dutta, H Peters, A Sen Social Choice and Welfare 28 (1), 163-179, 2007	37	2007
The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result A Sen Social Choice and Welfare 12 (3), 277-292, 1995	36	1995
Understanding when agents are fairmen or gamesmen M Spiegel, J Currie, H Sonnenschein, A Sen Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1), 104-115, 1994	34	1994
Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction B Dutta, A Sen Social Choice and Welfare 10 (2), 149-160, 1993	33	1993

El sistema no puede realizar la operación en estos momentos. Inténtalo de nuevo más tarde.

Artículos 1–20

Citas por año

Citas duplicadas

Citas combinadas

Añadir coautoresCoautores

Subir PDF

Seguir a este autor

Citado por

Coautores